We study the e¤ects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a bank, who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. We have three treatments with di¤erent levels of deposit insurance which re ‡ect the losses a depositor may incur in the case of a bank run. We …nd that di¤erent levels of deposit insurance and the possibility of observing other depositors' actions a¤ect the likelihood of bank runs. When decisions are not observable, higher levels of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs. When decisions are observable, this need not to be the case. These results suggest that (i) observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance, and that (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability (JEL Codes: G21, C90)
Introduction
This paper investigates how deposit insurance and observability of previous actions a¤ect the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. In 2007, the run on the English bank Northern Rock heralded the recent …nancial turmoil. This bank su¤ered massive withdrawals within days despite that bank deposits in the UK were insured. Other …nancial institutions like the Washington Mutual, Countrywidebank or the IndyMac Bank in the US, or the Bank of East Asia in Hong Kong also have experienced bank runs. Media coverage that made observable the lines in front of the bank o¢ ces might have contributed to the protraction of the runs.
Deposit insurance is regarded as one of the pillars of modern …nancial safety nets. The main objective of deposit insurance is to protect depositors who cannot generally make an informed assessment of the risk that the bank to which their funds are entrusted may fail. During the recent crisis, one of the public aims has been to maintain the con…dence in the …nancial intermediation and to avoid runs on banks without problems with the fundamentals. To this purpose, the level of deposit insurance has been increased worldwide. In the US, the deposit insurance changed from covering the …rst $100.000 to the …rst $250.000 in 2008. In the EU, the new Directive 2009/14/EC protects the …rst e100.000, in contrast with a minimum of 90% of the …rst e20.000 protected by the previous Directive. In the UK, deposit insurance covered 100% of the …rst £ 2.000 and 90% of the …rst £ 35.000 by the time of the run on Northern Rock. Several changes since then increased the limit until 100% of the …rst £ 85.000. These measures have been reinforced by some governments announcing an implicit unlimited protection to the deposits. Given the size of the bank system, the increase in the deposit insurance limits supposes the assumption of huge risks. Clearly, analyzing the e¤ectiviness of di¤erent levels of deposit insurance would help policymakers to design adequate measures to prevent runs. Ireland was the most important factor in whether they withdrew or not. The authors explain this result arguing that immigrants from the same county tended to cluster in neighborhoods of their own, making their decisions "observable" (i.e., when they decided to withdraw, others from the same county got information about it and prompted the observers to follow suit). Starr and Yilmaz (2007) use detailed data provided by a bank that su¤ered a run in Turkey in 2001. The authors group depositors according to their deposit size and study how the behavior of these groups depended on previous withdrawal hikes. They show that the behavior of depositor groups of di¤erent sizes was responsive to actions of their peers, but not always to the observable behavior of depositors of other groups. In a recent study, Iyer and Puri (2011) investigate the underlying reasons for a run that a¤ected an Indian bank in 2001. Their results highlight that a depositor's likelihood to run is increasing in the fraction of other people in his/her social network that have run. Overall, these studies make clear that understanding how observability in ‡uences the existence of bank runs is also of …rst order importance.
We design an experiment to study how di¤erent levels of deposit insurance and observability of actions a¤ect the emergence of bank runs. The lack of detailed data about depositors' behavior in real-world situations complicates the analysis of these issues. Carrying out laboratory experiments that mimick bank runs may be a useful way to shed light on the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent levels of deposit insurance, given various degrees of observability of depositors' behavior. Laboratory experiments are uniquely suitable to address this question: by carefully manipulating the information that subjects receive, it is possible to study how depositors react to this information, avoiding the e¤ect of other variables and focusing our attention on the e¤ect of di¤erent levels of deposit insurance.
We study bank runs using a coordination game that follows the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) .
There are three depositors lining up at a bank, in which earlier they deposited their endowments of 40 monetary units (MU). Depositors are randomly assigned a position (that is made known to them). This position determines the order in which depositors choose between waiting or withdrawing their money from the bank. 1 Each depositor knows her own liquidity needs, which is private information. Following the literature, we consider two types of depositors. There is an impatient depositor who has an immediate need for funds and always withdraws her deposit. The other two depositors are patient, so they do not need their money urgently and decide whether to withdraw their funds from the bank or to keep them deposited.
Whether the other depositors'decisions are observable is determined by the position in the sequence and the informational setup. In this paper, we focus on two setups: the simultaneous and the sequential one.
In the simultaneous setup depositors do not have any information about what other depositors have done whereas in the sequential setup each previous decision is observable and depositors acting early are aware that their decisions will be observed.
In the experiment, the impatient depositor is simulated by the computer and is forced to withdraw. The patient depositors choose between waiting or withdrawing during 15 rounds, with variation of information and position in each round. If both of the patient depositors decide to wait, they receive the highest possible payo¤ (70 MU). Withdrawal yields a lower, but a still relatively high payo¤ (50 MU) to the …rst two depositors who decide to withdraw, regardless of her liquidity needs. 2 The payo¤ for a depositor that withdraws after two withdrawals is 20 MU. Deposit insurance becomes relevant when a patient depositor waits alone. In this case, we consider three possible payo¤s which correspond to three di¤erent treatments. When there is no insurance, the patient depositor who waits alone receives a payo¤ of 20 MU which is as low as the payo¤ she would receive upon withdrawal once the other two depositors have withdrawn. 3 In the case of low insurance, the patient depositor who waits alone receives a payo¤ (30 MU) that is lower than the initial endowment and lower than the payo¤ to the …rst two withdrawing depositors. Nevertheless, it is higher than the payo¤ in the no-insurance case. In the high insurance case, a depositor who waits alone receives her initial endowment (40 MU). Hence, when there exists high insurance a patient depositor cannot lose money compared with the initial endowment, but still the …rst and second depositors who withdraw receive a higher payo¤. Given these payo¤s, bank runs can be approached as a coordination problem, meaning that a patient depositor prefers to wait if the other patient depositor does it as well (Diamond and Dybvig 1983 ).
We de…ne a bank run as a situation in which at least one of the patient depositors withdraws. While previous experiments study how the likelihood of bank runs varies as the level of deposit insurance changes, ours allows also for variation in observability. This new dimension is shown to be relevant since depositors' choices may be a¤ected by other depositors' decisions as testi…ed by our experiment. The possibility of observing early withdrawals may spark o¤ a bank run despite high levels of deposit insurance. Though, if early depositors are observed to keep the money in the bank, bank runs would be less likely to occur.
Our experimental data is in line with the latter hypothesis. We show that observability plays a role in the emergence of bank runs as the sequential setup decreases signi…cantly the likelihood of bank runs with respect to the case of simultaneous decisions. As expected, deposit insurance is also important in reducing the likelihood of bank runs since both low and high insurance decrease the likelihood of bank runs in any of the two setups.
When investigating the interplay between the di¤erent levels of insurance and observability we …nd that their e¤ects are not independent. If decisions are not simultaneous but sequential, deposit insurance decreases the likelihood of bank runs, but the e¤ects of high and low insurance in our experiment are not signi…cantly di¤erent. This is the main contribution of the paper, since it is shown that the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent levels of deposit insurance depends on the degree of observability, a …nding that is absent in the literature. This fact has potentially important policy implications. Lately, many scholars have argued that the moral hazard associated to deposit insurance may do more harm than the bene…ts it gives. Moral hazard arises under deposit insurance because it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. In this vein, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) …nd that weaknesses in the deposit insurance arrangement increase the likelihood that a country will experince a banking distress. Since deposit insurance and observability are found to be partial substitute, our results suggest that bank runs can be prevented with a lower level of deposit insurance in environments characterized by high level of observability. Thus, the policymakers should investigate the degree of observability to design the optimal deposit insurance. For instance, if the policymaker considers that on-line banks decrease observability, then the level of deposit insurance for those institutions should be increased. The contrary is true if the level of observability is high (e.g., media reports extensively on …nancial issues or banks operate in a transparent way that makes information about other depositors'decision available).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature and relate it to our …ndings. In Section 3 we present the experimental design. We report our results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and discusses our …ndings.
Related literature
Two of the main features of our paper are that bank runs are modeled as a coordination problem and that other depositors' actions by considering a social network that channels information. 4 Our experimental data suggest that observability might foster coordination and avoid bank runs. We then provide evidence supporting the idea to incorporate observability into the theoretical models. runs. 5 Our contribution is to show that observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance, so that optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability. This …nding goes one step further than the empirical evidence provided by Iyer and Puri (2011) , who highlight the importance of deposit insurance and observability of actions. The authors show that deposit insurance is partially e¤ective and observability a¤ects the propagation of bank runs, but they do not analyze the interplay between the two. 
Experimental Design
A total of 192 students were recruited from the undergraduate population of the Universidad de Alicante.
Students had no (or very little) prior exposure to game theory. The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory of Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx), using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007 ). The laboratory consists of 24 computers in separate cubicles and any form of communication between subjects was strictly forbidden.
We used a between-subject design and ran a total of 8 sessions, which correspond to three di¤erent treatments as detailed below. In each session, instructions were read aloud. We let subjects ask about any doubts they may have had before starting the experiment. 6 The average length of each session was 45 minutes. Subjects received on average 12 Euros for participating, including the show-up fee of 4 euros.
In each session, subjects were divided into two matching groups of 12. Subjects from di¤erent matching groups never interacted with each other throughout the session. Within the same matching group, subjects were randomly and anonymously matched in pairs at the beginning of each round. Each of these pairs was assigned a third depositor, simulated by the computer so as to create a three-depositor bank in each round.
Subjects knew that one of the depositors in the bank was simulated by the computer.
In each session, the three depositors played a coordination problem for 15 rounds. In each round, depositors invested an initial endowment of e = 40 monetary units (MU) in the bank. 7 Then, they were randomly assigned a position in the sequence of decisions and asked to decide consecutively, as if they were in the line of a bank. Subjects knew their position in the line. It was known that the the computer was programmed to withdraw always, regardless of the position in the sequence. The subjects were allowed to decide between waiting or withdrawing in each round. Before making this decision, depositors possibly observed previous decisions within the same round and they knew whether they would be observed by subsequent depositors. In the experiment, we considered di¤erent information structures in each round. 8 6 The instructions for the experiment are originally in Spanish. A translated version is available in the web Appendix. 7 We used Spanish pesetas as experimental currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer problems, compared with other currencies (USD or euros, for example). On the other hand, although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use, Spanish people still use pesetas to express monetary values in their everyday life. In this respect, by using a "real" currency we avoid the problem of framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g., "experimental currency") with no cognitive content. 8 Subjects faced a di¤erent problem in each round. We studied all informational setups that may arise with three depositors, so we also had structures with partial information. For instance, depositor 3 may know what depositor 2 has done but she may have no information about depositor 1's decision. Results for the partial environments are similar to those discussed and are available upon request. An interesting question is whether subjects faced each round as a "new game" or they learnt how to play. The Chow test reveals that subjects did not behave di¤erently in the second half (rounds 8 to 15) of the experiment.
To describe depositors'payo¤s, let y i 2 f0; 1g for i = 1; 2; 3 denote the decision of depositor in position i, where 0 denotes keeping the money in the bank and 1 indicates withdrawal. We denote as c If a depositor chooses to keep the money in the bank, she has to wait until everybody has decided. If both subjects wait, then each of them receives 70 MU. Deposit insurance becomes e¤ective if there is only one depositor who decides to wait. 9 We study three levels of insurance. In the case of no insurance (NO) the depositor lacks any protection and receives the residual funds the bank has after two withdrawals (20 MU). We ran two sessions with this treatment (48 subjects). In the case of low insurance (LOW ) the only depositor who decides to keep her funds deposited receives a higher payo¤ (30 MU), but this payo¤ is still smaller than her initial endowment. We ran two sessions with this treatment as well (48 subjects). High insurance (HIGH ) means that a depositor who chooses to wait cannot lose money, so she receives 40 MU.
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Four sessions were run with this treatment (96 subjects). Payo¤s for any subject i 2 f1; 2; 3g who decides to wait are:
where the …rst symbol (0) in the subscript shows that depositor i waits, while the second symbol denotes the other subject's decision. Superscripts stand for the treatment.
Payo¤s resemble the ex ante optimal contract in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and allow for coordination problems, satisfying the following relations: where D 2 fN O; LOW; HIGHg represents the level of deposit insurance. 11 A key element is that when depositors decide, they know their position but they may not be sure of the payo¤ they will receive. For instance, imagine a subject in position 2 who observes a withdrawal. She does not observe whether the withdrawal was due to the other subject or the computer. In the …rst case, the maximum payo¤ she may receive is 50 MU whereas in the latter case she may obtain 70 MU depending on the decision of depositor 3.
Similarly, if depositor 3 in the simultaneous setup decides to withdraw, she does not know whether she will receive c 1 = 50 or c 11 = 20.
We de…ne a bank run as a situation in which at least two withdrawals occur. This is the broadest de…nition, according to which a withdrawal due to a subject (other than the computer) already constitutes a bank run. 12 Hereafter, we study how deposit insurance and observability a¤ect the likelihood of bank runs.
In the simultaneous setup, subjects knew their position but were not aware of predecessor's actions. In the sequential setup subjects knew the decisions of their predecessors and that their decision would be observed by subsequent subjects. The fact that decisions are observable in the sequential setup is in line with the empirical evidence presented in the introduction, which also suggests that (i) depositors react quick to this information (e.g., Starr and Yilmaz 2007) and that (ii) the bank's assets available to pay o¤ depositors may decline faster than observability reveals withdrawals (i.e., the bank in our experiment cannot pay 50 MU to all depositors who decide to withdraw). Our payo¤s then have the same structure as in Garratt and Keister 
Experimental Evidence
In this section we analyze the data gathered during the experimental sessions. The main results and insights are summarized in Table 1 . In this table, we report the relative frequency of bank runs in each treatment. We present the data for both the simultaneous and the sequential setup separately. The number of observations appears in brackets. that prevent bank runs. These contracts require that the bank should know the depositors' utility function. This condition cannot be met in a lab experiment. Instead, we take a contract that allows for the coordination problem in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and study whether the likelihood of bank runs is a¤ected by the level of deposit insurance and the degree of observability. 1 2 Bank runs might be also thought as a situation in which "too many" withdrawals take place in a "short" period of time.
Our model does not consider this option since we follow the literature in which only the number of withdrawals (and not its speed) matters. Table 1 We observe that di¤erent levels of deposit insurance a¤ect the likelihood of bank runs in a di¤erent way. Table 1 shows that deposit insurance reduces the relative frequency of bank runs, as this frequency is higher when there is no insurance both in the simultaneous and the sequential setup. Other insight is that observability has a crucial e¤ect, since bank runs are less likely in the sequential setup except for the case of high insurance. In fact, the third important …nding is that the e¤ect of observability and deposit insurance are not independent. Although low and high insurance a¤ect di¤erently the likelihood of bank runs in the simultaneous setup, it does not seem to be the case in the sequential one. More precisely, we see that the relative frequency of bank runs in the simultaneous setup decreases, as the level of insurance increases. It does not happen in the sequential case, in which increasing the level of insurance from low to high does not help to reduce the relative frequency of bank runs. 13 In order to clarify the e¤ects of deposit insurance and observability, we estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is the probability of bank run. The dummy variables LOW and HIGH, take the value 1 when there exists low and high insurance respectively, being 0 otherwise. We de…ne SEQ as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the setup is sequential, and it is 0 if it is simultaneous. We propose the following speci…cation:
where F (z) = e z =(1 + e z ) and the variables LOW SEQ and HIGHSEQ capture the interaction e¤ects.
We run equation (1) over a total of 760 observations, which correspond to 760 banks, each of them with 2 subjects and the computer. We report the marginal e¤ects of the di¤erent explanatory variables in the column (A) of Table 2 . In column (B), the marginal e¤ects of low and high insurance in the sequential setup are reported. The standard errors take into account matching group clustering. Table 2 The baseline scenario is the simultaneous setup, when there is neither deposit insurance nor information about other depositors' decisions. In column (A), …rst we look at the e¤ects that deposit insurance and observability have separately. We observe that when the low insurance is implemented in the simultaneous setup, the likelihood of bank runs decreases by roughly 35%; whereas the high deposit insurance reduces this likelihood by approximately 60%. We also see that observability reduces the likelihood of bank runs, since the marginal e¤ect of SEQ is 23%. The fact that all these probabilities are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero implies that deposit insurance and observability decrease the likelihood of bank runs. If we test the null hypothesis that deposit insurance and sequentiality have the same e¤ect on reducing the likelihood of bank runs, we reject that hypothesis at 5% signi…cance level. (For the null hypothesis H 0 : LOW = SEQ ; we get Result 1. Deposit insurance and observability signi…cantly reduce the likelihood of bank runs. We reject the hypothesis that these variables have the same e¤ ect. More speci…cally, we observe that high insurance has the largest e¤ ect, followed by low insurance and observability.
The literature has shown the importance of deposit insurance to prevent bank runs. Our contribution is to indicate that observability of actions is also an essential factor in the emergence of bank runs. One unanswered question in the literature concerns the interplay between deposit insurance and observability.
In column (A) we see that LOW SEQ is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This indicates that partial insurance and observability do not have any additional joint e¤ect on reducing the likelihood of bank runs apart from the e¤ect that these variables have separately (i.e., the combined e¤ect is the summation of both e¤ects). As a result, we …nd that if there exists low insurance (observability), introducing observability (low insurance) signi…cantly decreases the likelihood of bank runs (i.e., we reject both the hypothesis that This …nding suggests that if the level of deposit insurance is low, the higher the degree of observability the less likely are bank runs. 14 The fact that observability is still important when depositors have the low insurance but it ceases to be relevant when the insurance increases suggests a relationship between the optimal level of deposit insurance and observability. In the column (B) of Table 2 , we study the impact that both low and high insurance have on the likelihood of bank runs when depositors decide sequentially.
We observe that both levels of deposit insurance decrease this likelihood by roughly 35%. Statistical test con…rms that no signi…cant di¤erence is observed between the impact of low and high insurance in this setup (i.e., in the regression Pr(Bank Runj SEQ = 1) = F ( 0 + LOW + HIGH ), where z(z) = e z =(1 + e z ), we fail to reject the null hypothesis H 0 : LOW = HIGH , since This result is important as it highlights that if …nancial intermediation is characterized by an information structure that allows observability, then there is no need to provide high level of deposit insurance. The e¤ect of a properly chosen partial insurance cannot be enhanced necessarily by a higher one. It has two important consequences. On the one hand, in an environment characterized by plentiful information less insurance is enough to reduce the likelihood of bank runs. On the other hand, these experimental results suggest that the goal of minimizing the likelihood of bank runs without increasing unnecessarily the moral hazard caused by the existence of deposit insurance can be achieved, at least when depositors are able to observe each other.
Conclusion
We have studied the e¤ects of deposit insurance and observability on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment that aims to disentangle the e¤ects of these factors and analyze their relationship. We …nd that when depositors'decisions are simultaneous, low and high insurance signi…cantly decrease the likelihood of bank runs, both levels of deposit insurance having a di¤erent e¤ect. When depositors'decisions are observable, we do not …nd any signi…cant di¤erence between the e¤ect of low and high insurance.
Our contribution is to show that (i) observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance, and that (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability.
These …ndings have implications for setting the optimal level of deposit insurance. In particular, our data suggest that an optimal deposit insurance scheme should rely upon the information structure (i.e., the information that depositors have about other depositors' decisions) so that there is no need to provide high levels of insurance to depositors when the degree of observability is high. In such an environment the likelihood of bank runs can be reduced without increasing exceedingly the moral hazard implied by high level of deposit insurance. Thus, if policymakers want to design adequate measures that o¤set moral hazard and contribute to the …nancial stability (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002) then more attention should be paid to investigate the level of observability.
It remains to be discussed, however, whether (and how) an optimal deposit insurance scheme could be determined as a function of bank-speci…c observability in the real life. We acknowledge that it is not straightforward to address this point. The empirical studies cited earlier highlight the importance of observability of actions but do not provide a clear measure of it. We consider that the foremost challenge to this literature may be the current lack of indexes that indicate how depositors communicate with each other. To contribute to this debate, we would like to point out some features that could be taken into account while constructing such an index. Consider the case of online and traditional banking. It seems safe to assume that the latter implies a higher degree of observability, so that it warrants requiring higher deposit insurance for those banks whose operations are done mostly through their online system. 15 The size of the banks could also be considered as a proxy for the degree of observability as small, local banks, where all depositors belong to the same community could be protected with a lower level of deposit insurance given that it is more likely that actions will be observed in that environment. Of course, the dispersion of the population and the existence of clusters or communities among the clients of the banks should also be considered while accounting for the level of observability of actions, as suggested by Kelly and O Grada (2002) . The type of customers of each bank is an important factor at stake too. If banks have di¤erent kinds of depositors then the degree of observability will be probably smaller than if depositors are somehow "homogenous". This latter insight is gleaned from Starr and Yilmaz (2007) where it is found that small depositors are quite responsive to other small depositors'withdrawal whereas they are only marginally responsive to shocks coming from mediumsize depositors and are unresponsive to large depositors'increased withdrawal rates. This result is explained because small depositors are not always able to observe large depositor's actions.
Clearly, the previous considerations are just the …rst steps toward designing an optimal deposit insurance scheme that takes into account the degree of observability. We agree that "communication channel tra¢ c needs to be directly measured" (Devenow and Welch 1996, p. 612). In their study, Devenow and Welch (1996) focus on herding behavior in …nancial markets and they helped to spark further investigation into the ways in which observability of actions a¤ect decisions in the equity markets. We think that the same steps can be followed when analyzing the depositors'behavior in …nancial intermediation.
Although our model incorporates sequential decisions and generalizes the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we do not consider the case of depositors deciding when to go to the bank. We lack theoretical models and empirical evidence in this regard. Building models that incorporate timing in the spirit of Gul and Lundholm (1995) and carrying out lab experiments allowing to choose when to withdraw would be fruitful areas for future research. Incorporating aggregate uncertainty into the model (e.g., the number of impatient depositors is unknown, as in Garratt and Keister 2009) is also a nice step for future research in this area.
6 Tables 
The number of observations appears in brackets. In total, we have 760 observations, each corresponding to a bank with 2 experimental subjects (i.e., observations correspond to a total of 1520 decisions). 
Treatment

Number of observations
We have 760 observations which correspond to 1520 decisions. The second column with 250 observations represents the case when we condition the regression on the sequential setup. The marginal effects reported in Table 2 are significantly different from zero at **1% or *5% significance level.
280
0.1735 0.1078 
Likelihood of Bank Run
